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China’s foreign policy has acquired more visibility and capacity for initiative in recent years, 
adapting both to the needs of its economic boom and the changing circumstances of international 
society. Besides playing a greater role in world affairs through the more discrete channels of inter-
governmental diplomacy, China has undertaken a series of activities with an eye to world public 
opinion, renewing or strengthening existing tools and creating others that are new. Among the 
former, official visits have multiplied –with China either making or receiving them– and the 
country has intensified and modernised its use of the news media. Highlights among the new thrusts 
include hosting major international events (the Shanghai Universal Exposition and the Olympic 
Games) and the implementation of an assertive policy of spreading China’s language and culture on 
the international stage. 
 
China Takes the Initiative 
 
As with other aspects of China’s modernisation, one can discern in its new diplomacy elements 
borrowed from other countries and these, combined with the circumstances of China itself, make 
for an original model. One unique characteristic of the Chinese model of public diplomacy rests in 
the fact that it has developed from a tradition of political propaganda typical of a single-party 
regime, as observed by Ingrid d’Hooghe. Unlike the Western systems from which it takes 
inspiration, the Chinese model stems from strong centralised power and works through channels 
tightly controlled by the authorities, leaving a very thin margin for initiative by other parties. This 
feature goes a long way towards explaining the Chinese system’s efficiency, but at the same time 
raises questions about its weaknesses. 
 
Behind the new Chinese diplomacy we find in the first place a new need to manage the country’s 
growing interdependence with the outside world. China has undergone a profound transformation in 
the past 30 years as a result of successive waves of reforms guided by a pragmatic combination of 
political continuity and free-market measures. Thanks to its demographic weight and the stunning 
growth of its economy, which would not have been possible without a progressive opening to the 
outside world, China is destined to play a leading role on the international stage. China is now the 
world’s fourth-largest economy and its third biggest buyer of oil. It holds more foreign currency 
than any other country, with much of it invested in the US, and is one of the planet’s top recipients 
of direct foreign investment. 
 
Chinese society is less and less an impenetrable world anchored in its millenary past or tied up in a 
revolutionary project. Contacts with the outside world are increasing in every realm of human 
activity. In 2005 Beijing airport rose from 20th to 14th place in the world ranking of passenger 
traffic. That same year China received 46 million visits (making it fourth in the world in that 
category), not counting trips to Macao and Hong Kong, and was seventh in the world in the amount 
its people spent overseas as tourists. China has surpassed the US in the number of cable TV 
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subscribers and telephone handsets. Only in the US are there more Internet users than in China, 
although Web penetration is still far from reaching levels seen in industrialised countries. The 
literacy rate among adults, although not evenly distributed, is around 90%. School attendance is 
close to 99% and the number of students enrolled in upper level education exceeded 17 million in 
2006. More children are learning English in China than in the US. At least 117,000 Chinese young 
people studied abroad in 2003; more than 700,000 did so from 1978-2003, according to the Chinese 
Education Ministry, most of them studying in Europe and the US. And the number of foreign 
students in China rose from 30,000 in 1995 to more than 100,000 in 2004, most of them from other 
Asian countries. 
 
By joining the process of economic globalisation, China has become more dependent on the outside 
world, and has more and more influence on the global economy. It needs to assure itself supplies of 
energy and raw materials, consolidate and diversify markets for its manufactured goods and acquire 
more knowledge and technology to give greater added-value to its products. As a result, its foreign 
policy is more open to taking part in world affairs through China’s joining international 
organisations, participating in peacekeeping missions and increasing development aid. And with 
greater and greater efficiency, it is making these policies known to world public opinion. China’s 
current generation of leaders, unlike the preceding one, makes many official visits abroad. Trips by 
President Hu Jintao, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and other ministers and senior officials to Europe, 
Africa and Latin America, their visits to China’s main partners (Australia, India, the US, Russia and 
Japan) and their presence in various forums of the industrialised world combine all these goals with 
the expression of public messages of friendship and cooperation. 
 
The Path of Peaceful Development 
 
Secondly, China’s new public diplomacy is guided by the need to project a friendly and attractive 
image on the world stage, one that dispels possible fears of a threatening hegemony. In the broad 
international debate on the rise of China, the ‘threat theory’ predicts that the expansive rise of the 
recently awakened Asian giant will inevitably lead to confrontation with its neighbours and even 
conflicts on a larger scale, as was the case with other emerging powers that lacked sufficient 
lebensraum in the past. In response to this position, there has emerged in China the theory of the 
peaceful ‘rise’ or ‘development’, the main goal of which is to lift most of China’s population out of 
poverty by taking part in economic globalisation and maintaining relations of cooperation and 
friendship with the rest of the world. China argues that its development depends on a peaceful 
environment and is linked to the development of the rest of the world in a win-win arrangement. 
China insists it does not seek domination or hegemony, bur rather the ‘building of a harmonious 
world’. 
 
So far the thesis of the ‘peaceful rise’ has for the most part been in sync with the form and content 
of Chinese foreign policy. China has defused potential regional conflicts and backed multilateralism 
on the world stage, allowing its international image to benefit from the damage the US has suffered 
because of its policy in the Middle East. It has assured itself the supplies it needs through 
diplomatic channels and averted pressure and confrontation in the battle for international markets. 
But in China’s peaceful path towards becoming a major power, many inside and outside the country 
seem to think China needs greater tools for gaining prestige and influence –in other words, more 
power of seduction–. Joseph Nye has stated that China, like India, has adopted ‘a foreign policy that 
made it more attractive in the eyes of others. But so far neither of these two countries has achieved 
a prominent position in the indices of soft power resources held by the United States, Europe and 
Japan. Although culture provides a degree of soft power, internal policies and values limit it, 
especially in China, where the Communist Party fears granting intellectual freedom and resists 
outside influences’ (‘La cultura asiática seduce’, Clarín, 23/XI/2005). 
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According to some tools for measuring countries’ global images, such as the Anholt Nation Brand 
Index, China’s international reputation has recently improved. Still, a recent report by the Foreign 
Policy Center described China’s image problem as an ‘emergency’, and called this China’s main 
strategic threat. The study pointed out what it called a strong contrast between the Chinese people’s 
image of themselves and how they are seen from abroad. The report said there is also a large and 
‘dangerous’ gap between this image from abroad and the reality of the recent achievements and the 
transformation of Chinese society. Certainly there are concerns over the rise of China that might be 
eased with better knowledge of its progress, values and culture. But to reduce contradictions 
between the Chinese development model and its relations with the rest of the world to a mere 
question of image would be an incomplete analysis. 
 
China’s rise causes contradictory perceptions and real worries abroad. Along with the positive 
expectations that it triggers as a huge market and land of new opportunities, its growth model also 
raises fears of plant relocations and job losses in the rest of the world. The purchasing power of the 
Chinese economy fuels growth in other regions, but at the same time its hunger for raw materials 
raises worries about price increases and possible shortages. There are jitters over the environmental 
repercussions of unbridled growth and the possible social and political consequences of wealth 
spread unevenly. Talk of ‘harmonious socialism’ clashes with travellers’ accounts of frenzied 
buying by consumers, unchecked real estate development and fabulous fortunes. China’s policy of 
internationalising its companies, which has culminated in attempts to buy major foreign firms, has 
at times run into a wall of opposition from western financial authorities. China’s efforts to invest in 
R+D and its progress in education and science are well known, but a record of violating copyright 
and industrial patents continues to drag down the image of Chinese manufacturers. 
 
Nor is China’s foreign policy free of contradictions. China’s traditional position as a leader of the 
developing world stands in sharp contrast to its fervent defence of economic globalisation. Its calls 
for peaceful coexistence do not sit well with the hefty investments China has made in modernising 
its armed forces. China’s protection of the government of Sudan jeopardises its image as it prepares 
to host the Olympic Games (‘Darfour collides with Olympics, and China yields’, NYT, 13/I/2007). 
On the domestic front, China’s economic success has not brought about significant political 
reforms. The single-party regime remains in force, even as the public sector’s role in the economy 
wanes. After the events of Tiananmen Square and the ebb of the timid process of change unleashed 
by the reforms of the 1980s, only very slowly are mechanisms of social control being eased, even as 
the new leadership shows a greater sensitivity to social imbalances stemming from strong economic 
growth. International scrutiny continues to turn up grave deficiencies in China’s human rights 
record, and demonstrations by world famous figures on Tibet continue to challenge China’s 
treatment of its regional minorities (Richard Gere, ‘Railroad to perdition’, NYT, 15/VII/2006). 
 
From Flyers to the Internet 
 
China maintains a monopoly over its news media and makes a great effort to control information 
flowing from the country to the rest of the world. It also works hard to keep most of its population 
oblivious to certain kinds of news content from abroad. The statistics that China makes available 
are incomplete and not readily accessible. There are hardly any institutions that publish reports or 
analyses with international scope that are critical or of an alternative nature. Except in controlled 
settings like tourist complexes, it is impossible to see foreign television channels freely or read the 
foreign press. China is said to employ tens of thousands of ‘cyberpolice’ who monitor the Internet 
with the goal of blocking engine-searches for certain expressions or access to specific web sites. 
 
Still, there is no doubt that despite government censorship, the extraordinary development of TICs 
in China is creating conditions for unprecedented development of free information and debate. A 
visit to government web sites in China, which are available in several languages, gives an 
impression of modernity and independence, and even of changing customs and freedom of opinion. 
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China has been abandoning old forms of propaganda and psychological warfare. Long gone are the 
days of flyers being rained down on Taiwan, or the export of revolution to other continents. The 
main organs of the Chinese government, including embassies, have Internet pages in English and 
other languages (www.china.org.cn boasts no fewer than 10, including Esperanto). Government-
controlled media do not shy from touchy subjects and explain progress in sensitive subject areas, 
although they always refer to government White Papers. 
 
The Xinhua news agency and the People’s Daily, the organ of the Chinese Communist Party, offer 
information in seven languages, including a simplified version of Chinese. The China Daily, which 
is billed as the ‘only national newspaper in English’, was created in 1981 and has a daily circulation 
of 200,000, a third of the total being distributed in more than 150 countries. It oversees other 
publications and supplements in English such as the local papers China Daily Hong Kong Edition, 
Shanghai Star and Beijing Weekend. In Hong Kong, the press seems to be under less rigid controls. 
The main television network, CCTV, has had a 24-hour channel in English since 2002, with 45 
million subscribers around the world. Radio China International, established in 1941, transmits 211 
hours of programming per day in 38 foreign languages, four dialects of Chinese and in putonghua 
(Mandarin, the official language of China). 
 
The communications sector is still monopolised by the State, and with the partial exception of Hong 
Kong and other enclaves with more international exposure, radio and television stations are still 
subjected to strict restrictions on content, as are the foreign companies that since 2005 have been 
authorised to broadcast via cable in some areas. Self-censorship is a toll that even the Rolling 
Stones had to pay, dropping some songs from their repertoire in the first concert they gave in China, 
in Shanghai in 2006. Meanwhile, penetration of foreign entertainment programmes is more and 
more intense thanks to agreements with local corporations such as the Shanghai Media Group and 
Hunan TV (NYT, 28/XI/2005, 16/I/2006), which are state owned but have a clearly commercial 
management style (the limits between state owned and private property are seeming more and more 
diffuse these days). Foreign programmes also reach Chinese receivers through an undetermined 
number of illegal satellite dishes. Although imports of foreign cultural products are severely limited 
(around 20 full-length films per year in the case of cinema), western cultural influences make their 
way in through other channels, such as distribution of music or films over the Internet or other 
means (an estimated 95% of the films sold in China are bootleg copies), often after having been 
‘orientalised’ in Taiwan or South Korea. (NYT, 2/I/2006). 
 
Reserves of Soft Power 
 
Along with increasing official contacts and visits and changing the way it communicates with the 
outside world, China has begun to use other tools of public diplomacy. Chief among these are the 
staging of major international events (Summer Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008, the Universal 
Exposition in Shanghai in 2010) and an active policy of cultural and educational exchanges. 
 
Although they are consistent with the strategy of a peaceful ascent and integrated into the overseas 
information policy, to a large extent these programmes use different channels to the ones discussed 
earlier. As is the case in other countries, cultural relations seek to build confidence and credibility 
over the long term through permanent contact with key social sectors in other nations, rather than 
achieve concrete, immediate goals through focused political messages. As Jan Melissen has 
observed, recent trends in overseas cultural policy have tried to have cultural relations maintain a 
certain distance from direct, official messages, even if the relations are promoted by government 
bodies. At the same time they have broadened their scope to include questions such as human 
rights, democratic values, the role of the news media, etc, without skirting issues of sensitive 
national debate. Although Chinese civil society is far from reaching levels of independence 
comparable to industrialised democracies, China’s new public diplomacy seems to have taken 
careful note of how to strengthen the country’s image abroad through cultural relations. 
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The influence of Chinese culture spread throughout Asia and elsewhere in the world long before the 
Beijing government decided to incorporate it as an asset in its relations with other countries: in fact, 
about 30 centuries before. China suffers from no lack of ‘soft power’ reserves to back up its cultural 
heritage: a centuries-old intellectual tradition which extended to neighbouring countries in the first 
millennium BC; inventions like paper, gunpowder, the printing press, porcelain or silk spread 
through Asia before reaching the West with medieval travellers. The distant image of Cathay and its 
riches inspired European maritime expansion. Ancient Chinese philosophy, traditional medicine, 
martial arts, calligraphy and painting were made known around the world by missionaries, traders 
and diplomatic envoys, especially starting with the period of the Unequal Treaties. Starting in the 
late 19th century, the Chinese Diaspora established crafts, gastronomy, gymnastics and the holidays 
of the Chinese calendar in many capitals of Europe and the Americas. 
 
Chinese government bodies take it upon themselves regularly to recall these achievements of the 
past, and others that are less well known, through news such as that of the discovery of an old map 
suggesting China discovered the Americas (‘China beat Columbus to it, perhaps’, The Economist, 
12/I/2006), or the appearance of fossils that challenge beliefs on the original dwelling place of 
homo sapiens, or the finding of the oldest known traces of paper. Recovering the past prior to 
China’s stagnation in the 19th century also serves the function of boosting national pride (‘China 
gives no ground in spats over history’, Washington Post, 22/IX/2004) and staking a claim to being a 
first-grade international power (‘La Chine s’imagine en grande puissance’, Le Monde, 5/II/2007). 
 
Indeed, China does not need to exert itself too much to stimulate interest in its culture beyond its 
borders. Some European countries have had to wait in line to hold ‘Crossed Years’ (Britain, France, 
Italy, Russia and Spain this year, Greece in 2008, coinciding with the Olympic Games) or to gain 
permits for opening cultural centres in Chinese territory. Museums in the West stage major exhibits 
of Chinese art, such as Three Emperors at the Royal Academy of Arts, which coincided with the 
visit President Hu Jintao paid to London in 2005. Auction houses are posting record sales of 
Chinese pieces (although with upward price pressure from Chinese buyers), both classical and 
contemporary (‘Sotheby’s bets on a windfall for today’s Chinese art’, NYT, 29/III/2007). 
 
New Cultural Assets 
 
Adding to its traditional cultural assets, China now features new, contemporary creations that are 
drawing more and more attention in the West. Since the late 1990s, western curators (and Chinese 
ones such as Hou Hanru) have been dedicating stands at art shows and exhibits to avant-garde 
Chinese art coming out of major urban areas. Even though such artistic expression is not free of 
censorship in China itself, the government ‘has finally realised that contemporary art “sells” 
wonderfully’ (‘El cuento chino’, ABCD, 8/IV/2006), and recently started sponsoring the creation of 
art centres (‘China pierde el pudor a través del arte’, El Mundo, 8/III/2007). Young Chinese artists 
are all the rage, promoted heavily by major galleries in Britain and the US. Christie’s global sales of 
contemporary Chinese art rose from €13.5 million to €90 million from 2004 to 2006 (‘El arte chino, 
por las nubes’, El País, 27/III/2007). Museums like the Pompidou Centre or the Guggenheim are 
considering opening branches in China (‘Los artistas chinos protagonizan el nuevo boom del 
mercado del arte’, La Nación, 16/I/2007). In Spain, Casa Asia regularly holds cultural events 
centring on China, such as the recent one on ‘hyperarchitecture and hyperdesign’. Artium and the 
Fundación ICO recently staged exhibits of contemporary Chinese photography and video. Modern 
Chinese dance has made its way to New York with troupes such as the Guandong Modern Dance 
Company, Beijing Modern Dance Company and Shen Wei Dance Arts (‘China’s pirouette into 
modern form’, IHT, 18/III/2007). 
 
Chinese literature has a hard time making a name for itself, although it is starting to carve inroads in 
literary supplements and on book shelves. In 2000, Gao Xingjian (exiled in France) won the first 
Nobel prize for literature by a Chinese-language writer. In 2004, Chinese as an original language 
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held 16th place on UNESCO’s Index Translationum with 274 translations, improving from 21st 
place in the period 1979-2002, although it is still ranked below Dutch (330), Portuguese (383) and 
Catalan (392). Chinese stands have emerged at international book fairs, offering above all low-cost 
printing but also translation rights (‘Less reading, more schmoozing at London Book Fair’, NYT, 
18/IV/2007). Government officials say that in 2004 China exported 1,314 publication rights and 
imported 10,040. In 2005 Penguin paid a record US$100,000 for the overseas rights to The Wolf 
Totem, a work by Jiang Rong that sold more than one million copies in China. Peter Jackson, 
director of Lord of the Rings, has purchased the rights to a screenplay (‘A novel, by someone, takes 
China by storm’, NYT, 3/XI/2005). China is the world’s leading printer, but its overseas book sales 
are far below those of Japan or South Korea, and those books which are exported deal mainly with 
traditional Chinese culture (‘Can culture be China’s next export?’, People’s Daily Online, 
29/XII/2006). 
 
Chinese cinema is growing in volume and awards, but is only slowly winning over fans at Western 
box offices. In 2006 a record number of 330 films were produced in China. This year Jia Zhangke 
won the Golden Lion award in Venice for his film Still Life, and Zhang Yuan took a prize in Berlin 
for Little Red Flowers. In 2004, Xu Jinglei earned the award for best director for the film Letter 
from an Unknown Woman at the San Sebastián film festival. 2046, by Wong Kar Wai, received the 
Screen International Award, part of the European cinema prizes, in 2004. Zhang Yimou’s film Hero 
was nominated in 2003 for an Oscar for best foreign film. His more recent Curse of the Golden 
Flower has become the biggest box-office hit in the history of Chinese cinema. In 2002 Chen Kaige 
won the ‘Concha de Oro’ for best director at San Sebastián for Together. China’s biggest movie 
star, Gong Li, is a regular at the Cannes film festival. Meanwhile, China’s market for films shown 
in theatres is on the rise and luring interest from industries in neighbouring countries like Japan and 
Singapore (‘For Singapore filmmakers, China Beckons’, IHT, 11/IV/2007). And the emergence of 
Chinese-language films has not gone unnoticed by all-powerful American producers (‘China a hit 
in Hollywood, Bollywood a flop’, Asia Times, 22/VII/2005), which are aware of the potential of 
Chinese actors or directors such as Bruce Lee, Jackie Chan or Ang Lee (born, respectively, in the 
US, Hong Kong and Taiwan). 
 
Cultural Deficit and Government Action 
 
Despite these successes on the international scene, state-owned Chinese media complain of a deficit 
in cultural exchanges. They stress the efforts that government officials are making to correct this 
imbalance by stimulating domestic production and calling for greater creativity and diversity in 
China’s cultural products. Here is another incentive for implementing a formal policy of spreading 
Chinese culture: boosting that odd mix of merchandise and communicative power that is held by 
cultural products. The Report on Government Work that was presented at the 10th National People’s 
Congress in March 2007 gave a brief accounting of the development of China’s culture industry: 
‘We energetically developed culture and sports. The press and publishing, radio, television, film, 
literature and art, philosophy and the social sciences flourished. Culture-related facilities, especially 
in rural areas, were improved. The project to expand radio and television coverage in rural areas 
was extended from incorporated villages to unincorporated villages. Continued progress was made 
in the project to build multi-use cultural centers in communities, towns and townships and the 
national shared database project for cultural information and resources. Reform of the cultural 
management system was deepened. Development of the culture industry was accelerated, and 
cultural exchanges with other countries were increased (…). Efforts to promote socialist cultural 
and ethical progress were strengthened’. 
 
Cultural co-operation is not an isolated issue for the government but rather consciously integrated 
into the strategy for peaceful development: ‘As the trend of economic globalization develops in 
depth, China, all the more aware of the significance of exchanges and dialogues among different 
civilizations, is working harder to get the rest of the world to understand China, while absorbing 
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and drawing on the useful fruits of other civilizations. In recent years, China has cooperated with 
numerous countries in holding Culture Weeks, Culture Tours, Culture Festivals, thus helping 
promote exchanges and understanding between the Chinese people and other peoples, and creating 
new forms for equal dialogue between civilizations’ (White Paper on Peaceful Development Road, 
www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Dec/152669.htm). 
 
In a recent article, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao gave a more detailed explanation of cultural relations 
as part of China’s global strategy and described a complete programme: ‘We should expand cultural 
exchanges with other countries. Cultural exchanges are a bridge connecting the hearts and minds of 
people of all countries and an important way to project a country’s image. (...) We should use 
various forms and means, including tour performance and exhibition, Chinese language teaching, 
academic exchange and sponsoring culture year activities, to promote Chinese culture and increase 
its appeal overseas. We should implement a “going global” cultural strategy, develop culture 
industry, improve the international competitiveness of Chinese cultural enterprises and products, 
increase the export of books, films, TV programs and other cultural products, so that these Chinese 
cultural products and particularly the best of them, will reach the rest of the world (...)’. Wen 
concludes by adopting the concept of public diplomacy: ‘We should conduct public diplomacy in a 
more effective way. We should inform the outside world of the achievements we have made in 
reform, opening-up and modernization in a comprehensive, accurate and timely manner. At the 
same time, we should be frank about the problems we have. (...) We should work to enable the 
international community to develop an objective and balanced view on China’s development and 
international role, so as to foster an environment of friendly public opinion for China’ (‘Our 
Historical Tasks at the Primary Stage of Socialism and Several Issues Concerning China’s Foreign 
Policy’, China Daily, 27/II/2007). 
 
Before the actual public formulation of this policy, China had already begun to invest considerable 
resources in a range of culture policies aimed overseas, on its own or in co-operation with other 
countries. In 2003 the Kennedy Center in Washington DC held the Festival of China, with a budget 
of US$2 million. After touring the globe, the Xian warriors stopped off in Spain in 2004 and they 
will soon visit the British Museum in London, where they will coincide with the China in London 
festival, held annually since 2006. The year of China in France was held from October 2003 to June 
2004, with hundreds of cultural activities. During a visit to Russia in late March of this year, 
President Hu Jintao inaugurated the year of China in Russia, which boasts 200 commercial, 
scientific and cultural activities. These and others mentioned in the earlier section are just some 
examples of this fledgling policy of China assuring a cultural presence overseas. 
 
The Return of Confucius 
 
Among the initiatives the Chinese government has undertaken to enhance the country’s image 
abroad, special mention should go to the policy for international promotion of the language. 
Although government sources say there are precedents that go back to the 1950s, the current policy 
for teaching Chinese as a foreign language ‘is an integral part of the current drive for reform and 
openness’. After a ‘severe setback’ during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), ‘the national power 
of China has made notable progress, and teaching of Chinese as a foreign language has entered a 
new phase of vigorous development’. In 1987, China formed what would later become the Office of 
the Chinese Language Council International (abbreviated as Hanban, from Hanyu Bangongshi, or 
China National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language). 
 
Hanban’s mission is ‘making the Chinese language and culture teaching resources and services 
available to the world, meeting the demands of overseas Chinese learners to the utmost, to 
contributing to the formation of a world of cultural diversity and harmony’. Its functions include 
supporting the teaching of Chinese in other countries’ educational systems, supervising the 
Confucius Institute and establishing institutes abroad; training specialised teachers and sending 
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volunteer teachers abroad; coming up with study plans and materials; and developing and 
promoting tests of students’ knowledge of Chinese. 
 
China’s Education Ministry explains the policy this way: ‘Teaching Chinese as a foreign language 
(TCFL) is an integral part of China’s reform and opening up drive. To promote TCFL is of strategic 
significance to popularize the Chinese language and culture throughout the world, to enhance the 
friendship and mutual understanding as well as the economic and cultural cooperation and 
exchanges between China and other countries around the world, and to elevate China’s influence in 
the international community’. It can be argued that the Chinese authorities have decided to promote 
their language for at least two reasons: to show the country has all the attributes of a major power, 
including an important international language, and to help foreigners get to know better China’s 
culture and values and thus be more inclined to accept China’s positions and vision of the world. In 
line with the theory of peaceful rise, one can also discern in official Chinese discourse a desire to 
present the international expansion of Chinese culture and language not as hegemonic or a bid to 
impose, but rather as just another component of the world’s cultural diversity, a richness in which 
different cultures must coexist in harmonious equilibrium despite their differences. 
 
The flagship of Chinese public diplomacy takes its name from the great sage whose moral and 
humanistic teachings spread through China and neighbouring countries starting in the 6th century 
BC. There would be nothing odd about China choosing the name of its most internationally famous 
man of letters, just like other institutes carry the names of Goethe, Dante Alighieri or Cervantes, but 
for the fact that China tried several times during the 20th century to wipe away all trace of 
Confucianism, especially during the Cultural Revolution. Now, however, the image of Confucius 
and the basic lines of his thought fit into the image that China wants to project to the rest of the 
world: harmony with other countries, virtuous government, mutual respect, loyalty, humanity and 
restraint. The recovery of the figure of Confucius also evokes the soft influence that China exerted 
over Asia in ancient times and its growing presence now in the region. Within China, the values of 
Confucianism are celebrated on state-run TV and once again appear on school curricula and even in 
official speeches, all as an ethic reference aimed at a society undergoing an abrupt transformation, 
one that finds itself halfway between the collectivism of the communist regime and China’s version 
of capitalism. It might be a home-grown alternative to the western cultural values associated with 
economic development and modernisation (‘The Confucian renaissance’, Asia Times, 16/XI/2005; 
‘Can the Sage save China?’, Newsweek, 20/III/2006; ‘Confucius re-enters China’s schools to parry 
Westerns ways’, Christian Science Monitor, 8/XII/2006). 
 
One Hundred Institutes in Three Years 
 
The success of the Confucius Institutes has been stunning. The first two opened almost 
simultaneously in Seoul and Maryland in November 2004. As this study went to print, the 
Institute’s web site said there were altogether 110 branches. Some recent press reports put the figure 
at more than 140 such centres as of March 2007 (‘The new tongue-in-chic’, China Daily, 
14/III/2007). Furthermore, some 100 foreign institutions have requested or shown interest in 
opening a new institute. It seems Hanban has broadened its initial goals by seeking to reach the 
figure of 500 institutes in 2010 and 1,000 in 2020. In order to teach Chinese to 100 million students 
in 2020 it is estimated that 5 million teachers will have to be trained. But according to the same 
figures, today there are only 5,000 teachers in China who are certified to teach Chinese to 
foreigners. In 2004 the Chinese government launched a programme to send ‘volunteers’ abroad to 
teach Chinese and train new professors. Just over 1,000 professors and an equal number of 
volunteers served abroad in 2006 (‘China moves to meet surging demand for Chinese language 
teachers’, People’s Daily, 20/III/2007). 
 
The spread of the Confucius Institute, now present on five continents, highlights the global 
ambitions of Chinese public diplomacy (see Table 1). Their distribution is also significant. They are 
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predominant in Asia and Europe, while the United States is the country with the highest number. 
Their presence in Africa is fledgling, but indicative of  
China’s growing interest in the continent. There are many fewer in Latin America, but no shortage 
of talk of centres opening soon. In Spain there are three Confucius Centres so far: at the 
Autonomous University of Madrid, the University of Granada and the University of Valencia.  
 
Table 1. Distribution of Confucius Institutes 















New Zealand 1 
Pakistan 1 
Singapore 1 
Sri Lanka 1 
Thailand 13 
Uzbekistan 1 






South Africa 1 
Turkey 1 
Zimbabwe 1 





















Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 1 
       EUROPE 44 
TOTAL 110 
Source: www.hanban.edu.cn, May 2007. 
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The organisational model of the Confucius Institute is more flexible than that of its western 
counterparts. This flexibility is attributable to a drive for rapid impact with meagre resources: 50 
employees at the central headquarters in Beijing (it opened a new building in April 2007, according 
to Xinhua) and diplomatic and educational staff at Chinese embassies and consulates, besides the 
professors and volunteers sent abroad. There are no precise and complete figures for Hanban’s 
budget. As a result of this frugality, the network has been able to grow swiftly only in an ‘organic’ 
way (‘Selling the sage of Qufu’, The Economist, 8/VII/2006). 
 
Rather than a physical and visible presence with buildings designated as such, the Institute prefers 
to set up shop in universities or institutes of higher education. Openings of new institutes are often 
part of an agreement or exchange of letters during a meeting or official visit between Chinese 
leaders and those of other countries, and as such they appear in press communiqués along with 
other official announcements. Other times such openings are the result of a request by a foreign 
entity received in the central headquarters. In all cases, the institutes are founded through 
agreements with universities or other institutions, under which the latter contribute the 
infrastructure (premises, computers, academic planning) and the Chinese authorities agree to 
contribute financial aid, teachers and other forms of backing (cultural activities, teaching material). 
 
Presumably the nature and volume of this aid depends on the means and resources that the host 
institution can earmark for the institute. For instance, the Confucius Institute of Kansas received 
US$100,000 a year from the Chinese government and US$150,000 from the university the year it 
opened (‘Confucius Institute defends funding, mission’, Associated Press, 8/I/2007). Harvard 
turned down financing from the Chinese government so as to keep its academic independence from 
being called into question. The University of Vancouver vetoed the formation of a board of trustees 
independent from the governing body of the university (‘Teaching the ABCs of Chinese’, 
www.canada.com, 16/XII/2005). Nor has controversy been absent from the opening of institutes in 
the US, as seen in these and other cases (‘Why China wants you to learn Chinese’, Christian 
Science Monitor, 4/I/2007). 
 
In July 2005 the first International Congress of the Chinese Language was held, bringing together 
officials from the 25 institutes open at the time, in addition to other experts and educational 
professionals. China also pays attention to scholars of Chinese history and civilisation: in March 
2007 the World Conference on Sinology was held in Beijing. 
 
Besides running the international network of institutes, Hanban is in charge of administering 
official Chinese language exams. Government officials say more than half a million people have 
passed the Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi or HSK (Chinese proficiency test) since it was created in 1990. 
Many of them are or were foreigners studying in China: while in the mid-1980s some 8,000 
foreigners studied in China each year, in 2005 the time had risen to 140,000. That year 117,660 
foreigners took the test, up from 26.5% from the previous year. 
 
The Rise of the Chinese Language 
 
China’s institutional effort to promote its language receives help from the growing demand to learn 
Chinese as a foreign language, a reflection of China’s upward political and economic path. Official 
Chinese studies say there are between 30 and 40 million people studying Chinese around the world, 
and around 2,500 universities and institutes of higher learning offering Chinese classes in more than 
100 countries. The fever to learn Chinese mostly affects neighbouring countries, the origin of most 
of the university students who go to China. In South Korea the number of students of the Chinese 
language rose 66% from 2000 to 2005, reaching 160,000. In Japan the number of schools offering 
Chinese trebled from 1993 to 2005, and it is now the second most frequently taught foreign 
language after English. Thailand has set for itself the goal of having 30% of students register to 
study Chinese over the next five years. China supports this trend by providing technical teaching 
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assistance and through development aid, for example giving assistance for students to attend 
Chinese schools in Cambodia. 
 
The rise in demand is also felt outside the Asia-Pacific region, especially in the US. If the data 
provided by Berlitz are anything to go by, in 1984-2004 the demand for Chinese language teaching 
grew by 454.01%, faster than for English (43.29%) and Spanish (9.57%), while there was a decline 
in the demand for Italian (-17.23%), French (-17.29%) and German (-42.89%) (I Informe Berlitz 
sobre la demanda de enseñanza de español en el mundo, 2005). However, at the university level 
Chinese still lags far behind languages such as Spanish, French and German, with 34,153 students 
signing up to study it in 2002 (2.1% of the total, compared with 53.4%, 14.5% and 6.5% for these 
others, respectively). But Chinese grew more than those languages in the preferences of university 
students in the period 1998-2002, according to the Modern Language Association. With data not yet 
available for the period immediately after this, presumably in the past five years growth has been 
even greater (64% from 2000-05 according to some sources). At the primary and secondary 
education level, Chinese language teaching is still quite scarce, although it is rising. A report by the 
Asia Society (‘Expanding Chinese-Language Capacity in the United Status’, 2005) estimates there 
are around 24,000 children learning Chinese in primary and secondary education, and another 
150,000 in ‘Heritage Schools’. At least 27 states offer the Chinese language in their state school 
systems. According to the Center for Applied Linguistics of Washington DC there are 12 private or 
state schools that offer immersion programmes in Mandarin (and one in Cantonese). News on 
openings of Chinese courses in schools and universities are growing in local newspapers. In 2003, 
Chinese was offered at 200 primary and secondary schools but in 2006 the number was 600. The 
College Board signed a five-year accord in April 2006 with Hanban to expand teaching of Chinese 
language and culture in American universities. As a destination for study abroad China posted the 
third-highest growth among US university students in the period 2003/04-2004/05, according to the 
Institute of International Education, after India and Argentina, although it only reached 8th place, 
with 3.1% of the total of overseas study spots. 
 
The teaching of Chinese and other non-European languages has won the support of federal 
authorities in the US. The Senate is considering a bi-partisan bill to earmark US$1.3 billion for the 
teaching of Chinese in state schools. The Chicago state school system has developed the largest 
Chinese programme over the past six years: almost 3,000 pupils are studying Mandarin in 20 
schools. In 2005 the Defense Department provided a grant of US$700.000 to the University of 
Oregon and the Portland area to help students of Mandarin throughout their educational years. The 
State Department will require greater linguistic skills from its diplomats, especially in Chinese, 
Urdu and Arabic (‘Diplomats will be shifted to hot spots’, Washington Post, 19/I/2006). The 
National Security Language Initiative, launched by President Bush in February 2006 seeks to 
encourage the teaching of foreign languages in the US and includes a federal assistance programme 
with US$114 million in funding. 
 
Table 2. The 10 most widely-spoken languages in the US 
 Nr of speakers 
English only 215,423,557 















Another important factor in the rise of Chinese, especially in Asia and North America, is the 
volume and distribution of the Chinese diaspora. An estimated 45 million Chinese-born people are 
living abroad. Chinese communities spread around the World make up a network for basic 
maintenance of the language by providing a basic educational structure. In the US, where the 
Census Bureau says there are 2.02 million speakers of Chinese (see Table 2), early demand for 
Chinese as a foreign language has been met first by ‘Heritage Chinese’ schools, which Chinese 
communities had originally organised spontaneously. They were first attended by parents who do 
not speak Chinese, a growing number of whom want their children to be exposed to the language. 
Over the past decade China has rebuilt its ties with organisations of ethnic Chinese in South-East 
Asia, among whom there is a better disposition towards the great power from which many fled for 
political or economic reasons (Eric Teo Chu Cheow, ‘China’s Rising Soft Power in Southeast 
Asia’, PacNet nr 19A, Pacific Forum CSIS, 3/V/2994). Some countries, such as Indonesia, have 




Will the new Chinese diplomacy succeed in its goal of fostering a more favourable international 
perception of this rising power? There is no doubt that the charm offensive China has launched in 
recent years has had an extraordinary impact in the rest of the world, with help from the growing 
political and economic weight of China and probably the decline of the US’s image. China’s 
capacity to lure has solid foundations (thousand-year-old values, cultural tradition and creative 
vigour) and there is no doubt that the great strides of the past quarter-century, which would have 
been impossible without an unprecedented opening up to the outside world, are creating conditions 
for even deeper transformations in Chinese society. But the inadequacies which still limit the full 
development of China, the imbalances caused by stunning growth and the contradictions in its 
foreign policy limit the credibility of the great power’s public relations policy and call into question 
its efficiency. Minxin Pei warns: ‘before we all start learning Chinese and marvelling at the 
accomplishments of the Chinese Communist Party, we might want to pause for a moment’ (‘The 
Dark Side of China’s Rise’, Foreign Policy, April-May 2006). 
 
All signs are that China still has a long way to go before it reaches the levels of prestige and 
intangible influence (‘soft power’) enjoyed by Europe or North America. In the end these are based 
on their high standard of living and a system of values that grants a high degree of individual 
freedom. Meanwhile, China takes careful note of the new international trends in public diplomacy 
for the management of its image abroad. However, it also monitors the criticism that the 
contradictions in its model of economic and political development receives overseas. Some 
incidents have put the Chinese authorities on the alert, such as an attack on an oil installation in 
Ethiopia that left nine Chinese workers dead, or Taiwan’s refusal to allow the path of the running of 
the Olympic torch to include the island. Certainly, the proximity of the Olympic Games in Beijing 
have had an influence on certain recent changes in the government, including the replacement of 
Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing by Li Yang Jiechi (ambassador to Washington from 2001 to 2005) 
and the incorporation of the first non-communist minister in many years, Wan Gang, to lead the 
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